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State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State 
Law© 
David S. Schwartz∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite leading a “federalism revival,”1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
has ignored the federalism problem inherent in its decisions 
nullifying state laws by holding them preempted. The most glaring 
example is the Court’s continuing adherence to its badly reasoned 
1984 decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating,2 which holds that the 
Federal Arbitration Act3 (FAA) binds state courts and preempts state 
law. Although the Court has expressed its fundamental “‘belief in the 
importance of state control of state judicial procedure,’”4 the 
Southland doctrine restructures state dispute-resolution processes for 
state law claims. And while the Court has stated that contracts are an 
area of traditional state regulation which federal courts should be 
“‘reluctant to federalize,’”5 the Southland doctrine goes a long way 
 © Copyright © 2003 by David S. Schwartz. All rights reserved. Not to be copied, 
distributed or cited without the author’s express written permission. 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. An earlier version 
of this Article was presented to the Roscoe Pound Institute’s Annual Forum for State Appellate 
Court Judges (July 18, 2003, San Francisco, California).  
 1. The leading federalism decisions, which have limited congressional commerce power, 
strengthened state “sovereign immunity,” and revived the Tenth Amendment, are well known. 
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002). 
 2. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 4. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (quoting Henry Hart, The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)); accord Johnson v. 
Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988). 
 5. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 183 (1989) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)). 
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towards entirely taking state courts and legislatures out of the 
business of making contract law. 
Federalism is a battle often waged in the courts.6 State judges have 
a special role in this battle, because, unlike their federal counterparts, 
they are sworn to uphold not one, but two constitutional systems. In 
this Article I argue that two principled tools of statutory interpretation 
designed to safeguard state autonomy in the name of federalism—the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance and the presumption against 
preemption—have been ignored, and indeed violated, by the federal 
courts in FAA preemption cases. I argue further that it is incumbent 
on state court judges to use these tools pursuant to their dual 
constitutional duties, which authorize and require them (1) to 
interpret federal statutes independently in the absence of a controlling 
Supreme Court precedent; and (2) to give due regard to the interests 
of their states in the enforcement of state laws in the absence of a 
clear congressional mandate to preempt those laws. This requires 
state courts to construe both the FAA itself and the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s FAA preemption precedents as narrowly as good faith 
permits.  
I. SOUTHLAND AS A FEDERALISM DISASTER 
The values of federalism, articulated in Gregory v. Ashcroft,7 
provide a basis for evaluating Southland’s federalism error: 
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the 
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized 
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of 
a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen 
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more 
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes 
 6. This battle is well illustrated by the remarkably frank criticism by a state supreme 
court justice of some lower federal courts’ overly broad approach to FAA preemption in 
Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939–42 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially 
concurring), overruled by Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 7. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
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government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry.8 
Each of these values of federalism assumes a substantial degree of 
state lawmaking autonomy; none would have much meaning if the 
states were merely “regional offices [or] administrative agencies of 
the Federal Government.”9 
Preemption doctrine represents the most significant and frequently 
applied limitation on substantive state autonomy in our constitutional 
scheme.10 While federal commerce power still potentially reaches 
most subjects of legislation even after United States v. Lopez11 and 
United States v. Morrison,12 preemption doctrine holds that Congress 
may nullify state law on any subject within federal legislative 
jurisdiction. Therefore,  
the true test of federalist principle may lie, not in the 
occasional effort to trim Congress’s commerce power at its 
edges . . . or to protect a State’s treasury from a private damage 
action . . . but rather in those many statutory cases where 
courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary 
diet of the law  
—namely, preemption cases.13 FAA preemption under Southland 
tramples on these federalism values by nullifying and federalizing the 
dispute resolution processes and contract law of the states.  
 8. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; accord United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) 
(citing Gregory as setting forth the “first principles” of federalism); id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that states can serve as “laboratories for experimentation” in social 
policy)).  
 9. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 10. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 
(1994).  
 11. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 12. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 13. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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A. The Southland Decision 
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,14 several California 7-Eleven 
convenience store franchisees sued the corporate owner-franchisor of 
the 7-Eleven chain in state court under various state law theories, 
including a state franchise law designed to protect franchisees from 
overreaching.15 Southland sought to compel arbitration of all claims 
pursuant to an arbitration clause in the form franchise agreement, but 
the California Supreme Court denied arbitration on the basis of a 
generic antiwaiver provision in the Franchise Investment Law which 
states that “[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision purporting to 
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with 
any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void.”16 
The California court reasoned that the arbitration agreement operated 
as a waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial.17 The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that section 2 of the FAA preempted the state 
rule against arbitrating statutory franchise disputes. The Southland 
majority reasoned that Congress, by basing the FAA on its power “to 
enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause,” must have 
intended to make “substantive” law binding on state as well as 
federal courts.18 “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the 
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by 
arbitration.”19 
Since Southland, the principle of FAA preemption has become 
firmly, if erroneously, established. The Supreme Court itself has 
reaffirmed or extended Southland in four cases, notwithstanding 
 14. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 15. California Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000 (West 2004); see 
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining 
purpose of the law). 
 16. CAL. CORP. CODE. § 31512 (West 2004) (emphasis added). This antiwaiver provision 
is modeled after an antiwaiver provision in section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77n, which has long served as a model for the drafting of consumer-protection statutes of all 
kinds through the country. See infra Appendix B. 
 17. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 31512 (West 1977)). 
 18. Id. at 11–12. 
 19. Id. at 10. 
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serious doubts about its correctness.20 Southland is a poorly reasoned 
decision on a number of grounds, as I have argued elsewhere.21 
Among its other failings, given the FAA’s silence on the question of 
the statute’s applicability in state court, and legislative history 
pointing strongly against a construction that the FAA preempts state 
law, the Southland preemption holding was a stretch and becomes 
increasingly difficult to justify in the ensuing federalism revival. For 
present purposes, I will focus on its impact on state law. 
B. Southland’s Current Effects on State Law 
Under Southland, the FAA has been construed to bind state courts 
and preempt state laws that target arbitration agreements for special 
barriers to enforcement, whereas “generally applicable contract 
defenses” and rules that “arose to govern . . . contracts generally” 
may be applied to arbitration agreements “without contravening 
 20. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (FAA section 2 preempts 
Montana statute imposing protective form requirements on arbitration agreements); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (FAA section 2 preempts Alabama 
statute barring enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 
483 (1987) (FAA section 2 preempts California statute barring enforcement of predispute 
arbitration agreements for wage and hour claims). In Circuit City Stores v. Adams 532 U.S. 105 
(2001), the Court brushed aside an opportunity to employ the federalism-based presumption 
against preemption which would have allowed the Court to decline to extend Southland further. 
Two other cases stated that the FAA would preempt state laws that “would undermine the goals 
and policies of the FAA.” Volt Info. Sci. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477–78 (1989); see 
also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (“[I]n the absence 
of contractual intent to the contrary, the FAA would pre-empt” state decisional law precluding 
punitive damage award by arbitrator). 
 While no member of the Southland majority has been on the Court since 1994, five current 
members of the Court have at one time or another stated that Southland was wrongly decided. 
See Southland, 465 U.S. at 18–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(dissenting from proposition that FAA section 2 preempts state statutes, as opposed to common-
law rules, limiting enforceabilility of arbitration agreements for certain types of cases); 465 
U.S. at 24 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Southland majority wrongly 
concluded that FAA section 2 created federal substantive rights that must be enforced in state 
courts); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); id. at 284–85 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Adhering to Southland entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction of 
state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes.”); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., 
joined by Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply in 
state courts.”). 
 21. See David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: 
The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p129 Schwartz book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:129 
 
 
 
[FAA] § 2.”22 The FAA thus preempts only those state laws that 
regulate arbitration agreements per se23 or that declare certain types 
of substantive claims non-arbitrable.24  
Even with these limitations, scores of state laws have been held 
preempted or have become subject to FAA preemption under 
Southland. In the past two-and-one-half years alone, at least fifty 
different state laws have been held preempted by the FAA.25 At least 
thirty states have one or more statutes containing antiwaiver 
provisions of the kind held preempted in Southland.26 Many states 
have tried to regulate arbitration agreements by creating specific 
exceptions to a general state rule of specific enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, but Southland preempts these laws.27 
A key, and frequently celebrated value of federalism, is that it 
enables states to serve as “laboratories for experimentation” in social 
policy.28 But preemption stifles state law “experimentation” not only 
by nullifying state laws on the books, but also by discouraging 
proposals to change the law. For example, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was considering addressing 
issues relating to adhesive arbitration agreements in its Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act, but determined that “the preemptive effect 
of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . dramatically limits meaningful 
choices for drafters addressing adhesion contracts . . . .”29 
 22. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686–87 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9); accord 
Allied-Bruce.  
 23. See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (nullifying Montana law require certain 
formalities for all arbitration agreements); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (nullifying Alabama 
law making predispute arbitration agreements per se invalid).  
 24. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (nullifying California law making arbitration 
agreements invalid for claims under franchise statute); Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 (same for 
statutory wage claims). 
 25. See infra Appendix A. 
 26. See infra Appendix B.  
 27. See Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21. 
 28. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 29. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW, ADHESION 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THE RUAA, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ 
uarba/arbr0500.htm (last modified Aug. 23, 2000). 
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C. The FAA and Federalism-Based Statutory Interpretation 
Principles 
1. Southland’s Dubious Constitutionality and the Constitutional 
Avoidance Doctrine  
A long-established principle of judicial restraint, the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance holds that “if a case can be decided on either 
of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a 
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will 
decide only the latter.”30 As a corollary principle, “where an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the 
intent of Congress.”31 The Court has failed to apply these principles 
in the Southland line of cases. 
The FAA is a statute that, at bottom, governs procedure. The 
choice of arbitration over litigation simply “trades the procedures and 
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition” of arbitral procedures.32 The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the fundamentally “procedural”33 
nature of arbitration agreements: arbitration agreements are “in 
effect, a specialized kind of forum selection clause,”34 in which a 
 30. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 31. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 
(2001) (internal quotations omitted). In Solid Waste Agency, a federal agency interpreted the 
Clean Water Act in a manner which raised a federalism-based constitutional question by 
“invok[ing] the outer limits of Congress’s power . . . .” Id. at 172. The Court gave a narrowing 
construction to the statute to avoid the constitutional issue. Id. at 173–74. 
 32. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 33. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481–82 
(1989) (overruling determination in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (arbitration affects 
substantive rights)). 
 34. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 482–83 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 
519 (1974)); accord EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 295 (2002) (arbitration agreement is 
“effectively a forum selection clause”); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) 
(“by agreeing to arbitrate . . . a party does not forego . . . substantive rights”); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 
at 26 (same); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985) (same).  
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party compelled to arbitrate “does not forgo . . . substantive rights,” 
but “only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”35 Thus, by holding that the FAA binds state courts, 
the Southland doctrine permits a federal restructuring of state dispute 
resolution procedures by supplanting such processes as a jury trial, 
discovery and plenary appellate review. That the mechanism for this 
restructuring under the FAA relies on the mediating device of a 
private contract term does not in any way lessen the federal intrusion 
on state dispute-resolution processes. The effect of Southland in cases 
involving no federal question, therefore, is to restructure state dispute 
resolution processes for state law claims.36 Cases in which a state 
would open its courts to litigants are compelled into arbitration under 
Southland, irrespective of the presence of a substantive federal 
interest—that is, a federal interest other than an interest in the dispute 
resolution process itself.  
The traditional means for Congress to guarantee certain 
procedures for federal claims is not to dictate procedure to state 
courts, but to create federal question jurisdiction to open the doors of 
the federal courthouse to the claim.37 The authority of Congress to 
restructure state dispute resolution procedures has been found to exist 
only in a handful of exceptional cases where a state procedure 
directly impairs a substantive federal claim or defense.38 Does the 
commerce power authorize Congress to restructure state dispute 
 35. E.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.  
 36. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson (1995), 513 U.S. 265, 284–85 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (Southland “entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to 
adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes.”).  
 37. To the extent there is a federal interest in protecting arbitration for federal claims filed 
initially in state court, that interest is adequately protected, even without Southland preemption, 
by removal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000 & Supp. II 2003). 
 38. Just as state courts may not discriminate against federal rights in exercising 
jurisdiction, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), so they may not uniquely disadvantage or 
discriminate against federal “rights of recovery” by imposing particular procedural obstacles. 
See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (state municipal immunity doctrine against § 1983 
claims in state court held preempted); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (application of state 
notice-of-claim statute for § 1983 claims in state court held preempted). However, in the 
absence of such discrimination, “federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.” Howlett, 
496 U.S. at 372. Thus, it is doubtful whether any federal power to control neutral state 
procedures in federal question cases exists at all. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922–23 
(1997) (neutral state rule denying interlocutory appeals not preempted by federal rule allowing 
such appeals for § 1983 defendants). 
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resolution processes for state law claims, even under the guise of 
“substantive” regulation of interstate contracts?  
The constitutionality of such a power is doubtful at best.39 In 
Johnson v. Fankell, the Supreme Court “made it quite clear that it is a 
matter for each State to decide how to structure its judicial system.”40 
The Johnson Court was unanimous in observing that “respect [for 
federalism] is at its apex when we confront a claim that federal law 
requires a State to undertake something as fundamental as 
restructuring the operation of its courts.”41  
When Congress displaces state dispute resolution procedures, in 
whole or in part, by creating exclusive jurisdiction in federal district 
courts or federal administrative tribunals,42 it does so by asserting 
plenary substantive authority over a particular subject matter, and at 
least implicitly identifying a strong federal interest in that subject 
matter.43 Thus, for example, collective bargaining agreements, 
although private contracts in form, have long been regarded as 
contracts carrying national public policy implications, due to the 
history of labor strife.44 
What exactly is the federal interest in restructuring state dispute 
resolution procedures for state law claims? The FAA, in contrast to 
federal labor law, evinces a congressional intent to bring private 
contractual arbitration agreements into general contract law, not lift 
 39. See A Review of the Global Tobacco Settlement: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 160 (1997) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe) (“For Congress directly 
to regulate the procedures used by state courts in adjudicating state-law tort claims—to forbid 
them, for example, from applying their generally applicable class action procedures in cases 
involving tobacco suits—would raise serious questions under the Tenth Amendment and 
principles of federalism.”); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court 
Procedures, 110 YALE L. J. 947 (2001) (Congress lacks constitutional authority to regulate 
state procedures for state law claims); Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed 
Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 42–52 (1999) (same).  
 40. 520 U.S. at 922 n.13. 
 41. Id. at 922.  
 42. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000) (original 
jurisdiction placed exclusively in federal district courts); National Labor Relations Act §§ 3, 10, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160 (2000) (original jurisdiction placed exclusively in federal administrative 
agency). 
 43. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (identifying federal 
interests).  
 44. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1960). 
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them out of it into a category of special federal concern. Not only has 
Congress failed, in the FAA or otherwise, to identify alternative 
dispute resolution as a matter of pressing national concern that must 
be imposed on all levels of government, but one searches the FAA in 
vain for any substantive federal policy that might be at stake in such 
matters as whether a state will keep its courthouse doors open to state 
law wage and hour claims. Although the FAA identifies a federal 
nexus—contracts involving interstate commerce or admiralty—the 
Supreme Court has never found in the FAA an intent to assert plenary 
substantive authority over all such contracts, even those interstate 
commerce contracts containing arbitration agreements. The absence 
of substantive federal policy underlying the FAA explains why the 
FAA does not even create federal question jurisdiction. It has 
become commonplace to answer the “federal interest” question by 
waving the flag of the so-called “national policy favoring 
arbitration,”45 but that is nothing more than a circular argument that 
fails to explain why Congress would, or constitutionally could, 
impose such a policy on the states. 
By holding that the FAA binds state courts and preempts state 
law, Southland thus violates the principle of constitutional avoidance, 
adopting a construction of the FAA that raises serious constitutional 
doubts when an alternative construction is highly plausible, and 
consistent with the intent of Congress. 
2. The Clear Statement Rule and the Presumption Against 
Preemption 
In a closely related doctrinal development, in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft,46 the Supreme Court established a rule of statutory 
interpretation designed to protect state autonomy against federal 
encroachment: “If Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional 
balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must 
make its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute.”47 A subset of this federalism-based “clear statement” rule is 
 45. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 46. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 47. Id. at 460 (internal quotations omitted). 
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the long-established presumption against preemption: “‘where . . . the 
field which Congress is said to have preempted includes areas that 
have been traditionally occupied by the States,’ congressional intent 
to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’”48  
One of the major failings of the Southland preemption doctrine is 
its total disregard for these principles. The FAA includes no “clear 
statement” of congressional intent to preempt state law, or to intrude 
heavily on the states’ traditional control over general contract law. It 
is widely recognized that the “national policy favoring arbitration” 
was not the creation of the FAA as written by Congress, but was 
instead a judicial creation—federal common law—that took the FAA 
as a point of departure.49 As clearly demonstrated in two scholarly 
dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court, the Southland opinion 
flouted the FAA’s historical record, which showed that Congress 
intended the FAA to be a procedural statute that neither applied in 
state court nor preempted state law.50 Even the Southland majority 
opinion conceded the absence of anything that would meet the “clear 
statement” test, by going outside the FAA’s text to rely on a 
legislative history that was “not without ambiguities.”51  
II. THE ROLE OF STATE JUDGES IN FAA PREEMPTION CASES 
State judges have a unique role in our constitutional system. They 
alone are assigned the delicate task of applying the law of multiple 
sovereigns (the law of their own states, of their sister states, and of 
 48. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). “To the extent that 
federal statutes are ambiguous, we do not read them to displace state law.” Allied-Bruce, 513 
U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord Southland, 465 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“The exercise of state authority in a field traditionally occupied 
by state law will not be deemed pre-empted by a federal statute unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”).  
 49. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has 
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal 
Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”).  
 50. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 23–31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 
at 285–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For additional historical evidence supporting the arguments 
in the O’Connor and Thomas dissents, see Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 
19–31. 
 51. 465 U.S. at 12. 
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the federal government) while bound by oath to uphold not one, but 
two constitutions, federal and state. At the same time, the U.S. 
constitutional system of checks and balances—both in its 
“horizontal” separation of powers, and its “vertical” structure of 
federal and state sovereignty—is designed so that a proper system-
wide balance will emerge if each constitutional participant acts 
attentively toward its own institutional interests.52 In this system, it is 
incumbent on state judges to remain particularly attentive to the 
balance between state autonomy and federal supremacy. 
Under the Supremacy Clause, state judges are obligated to apply 
federal law.53 But this obligation carries a concomitant power to 
interpret federal law independently. “[S]tate courts . . . possess the 
authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to 
render binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations 
of federal law.”54 While bound to follow an authoritative construction 
of a federal statute by the U.S. Supreme Court, state courts are not 
bound by lower federal court decisions.55 
Preemption cases bring the sometimes competing duties of state 
judges to the forefront. Viewing preemption cases merely as issues of 
statutory interpretation overlooks the crucial constitutional dimension 
to preemption. Preempting a state law is not merely “applying” an act 
 52. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 at 180–81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all 
times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the 
same disposition towards the general government.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 323 (James 
Madison) (“The [federal and state] governments will control each other, at the same time that 
each will be controlled by itself.”). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound” by federal law 
“made in Pursuance” of the Constitution); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 908 (1997); 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 54. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). 
 55. “This court is in any event under no obligation to follow federal lower court 
precedents interpreting acts of Congress when we find those precedents unpersuasive.” Graham 
v. Scissor Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 179 (Cal. 1981); accord Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 
376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Bodzai v. Arctic Fjord, Inc., 990 P.2d 616, 619 (Alaska 
1999); Brotman v. E. Lake Creek Ranch, L.L.P., 31 P.3d 886, 894 (Colo. 2001); State v. 
Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1976); Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 
345, 348 (N.Y. 1986); Kornman v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 662 So. 2d 498, 501 (La. Ct. App. 
1995); Northpointe Plaza v. City of Rochester, 457 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), 
aff’d, 465 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1991); Kiefer v. Cont’l Airlines, 882 S.W.2d 496, 502 (Tex. 
App. 1994). 
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of Congress, but involves two analytical steps: first, that the federal 
statute is intended to displace the state law or conflicts with it, and 
second, that the Supremacy Clause requires that the state law must 
give way to the federal statute. Southland was correct on this one 
point: a preempted state law “violates the Supremacy Clause” and is 
in that sense unconstitutional.56 
Preemption cases are highly significant for judges concerned 
about the issues of “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint.” Where 
the state law is statutory, to preempt it is to override the will of the 
democratically elected state legislature. If Congress has expressed a 
clear statement to the effect that state law is preempted, the 
preemption decision represents the decision of the national legislature 
to exercise its supremacy over the state legislature. But what if 
Congress has not made such a clear statement? Where preemption 
results from a freewheeling judicial gloss on a silent statute, the 
override of state law is no less an instance of “judicial activism” than 
the creation of a new constitutional right under the due process 
clause. But more than that, it is judicial activism in disregard for 
federalism values.  
FAA preemption should be viewed with particular caution by state 
judges because of its intrusion into state court procedures.  
When pre-emption of state law is at issue, we must respect the 
principles [that] are fundamental to a system of federalism in 
which the state courts share responsibility for the application 
and enforcement of federal law. This respect is at its apex 
when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to 
undertake something as fundamental as restructuring the 
operation of its courts.57  
The FAA says nothing about preemption, and even the Southland 
majority admitted that the legislative history was at best ambiguous 
 56. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act 
Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 397–98 (2004). 
 57. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 (1997) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); accord Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372–73 (1990) (states’ “great latitude to 
establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts . . . fundamental to a system of 
federalism in which the state courts share responsibility for the application and enforcement of 
federal law”). 
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on the intent to preempt. To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
decided that the FAA preempts certain state laws, and those rulings 
bind state judges under the Supremacy Clause. But in many specific 
cases, the answer to the preemption question is unclear; litigants may 
be pressing to expand FAA preemption into new applications. State 
judges who believe in “judicial restraint” and deference to the will of 
their state legislatures should be extremely hesitant to expand FAA 
preemption, and hesitant even to apply FAA preemption in close 
cases. U.S. Supreme Court decisions asserting FAA preemption can 
be applied faithfully, but narrowly. The state judge’s role under the 
state constitution is consistent with a rigorous application of the 
presumption against preemption and doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance. 
III. A FEDERALISM-BASED, “STRICT CONSTRUCTIONIST” APPROACH 
TO FAA PREEMPTION 
FAA preemption questions are all fundamentally about whether 
state law can affect the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 
Although these enforceability questions take a variety of forms, they 
all fall into either of two broad categories. First, “contract defenses” 
involve either “formation questions”—whether an agreement to 
arbitrate was made at all—or “validity” questions, which consider 
whether the arbitration agreement can be held unenforceable because 
unfair terms make it either unconscionable or void as against public 
policy. Second, “arbitrability” issues concern legal rules holding that 
a particular type of claim or remedy is unsuitable for arbitration. 
Some recurring topics raise both “contract defense” and 
“arbitrability” questions, but do so in a way that is analytically 
separable. For example, an arbitration agreement written by a 
company to prevent any consumer from bringing a class action 
against it may be held invalid on unconscionability grounds. But the 
issue of whether an arbitrator can issue class-wide relief is an 
arbitrability question. 
In this part, I argue that the federalism principles of constitutional 
avoidance and the presumption against preemption should guide 
courts—particularly state courts—in the resolution of both contract 
defense and arbitrability questions.  
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A. Contract Defenses: Formation, Unconscionability and Public 
Policy 
Properly understood, contract defense questions can—and 
should—always be analyzed as matters of state law, and should never 
be preempted by the FAA, so long as the state contract law in 
question does not expressly target arbitration agreements. This is 
made clear by FAA section 2 which “saves” all “grounds for the 
revocation of any contract,” as subsequently explained by the 
Supreme Court in Perry v. Thomas,58 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,59 
and Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto.60 The unconscionability 
doctrine and the doctrine of voidness as against public policy are two 
doctrines of general contract law that can be applied to arbitration 
agreements under FAA section 2. FAA preemption of these doctrines 
should be rejected under the federalism principles described above. 
The following are specific recurring examples of issues that should 
routinely be resolved as validity questions controlled by state law. 
1. Remedy-Stripping Provisions 
Many arbitration agreements join the arbitration requirement with 
the limitation that the arbitrator cannot award various remedies, such 
as non-economic damages, attorneys’ fees and, particularly, punitive 
damages. Similarly, a growing number of arbitration agreements, 
particularly in consumer contracts, attempt to bar class actions.61 
Such clauses should never be “enforced as written.”62 The Supreme 
Court has itself made clear that the doctrine of enforcing adhesive 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements presumes that “[b]y agreeing to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute.”63 For present purposes, the key point 
 58. 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
 59. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 60. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 61. A contractual class action bar is plainly a remedy stripping clause, since small, 
individual consumer claims may only be viable as class actions. See David S. Schwartz, 
Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability and Preclusion 
Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping]. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors 
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is that the grounds for invalidating such agreements are purely state 
law principles. Courts properly consider damages remedies—
including punitive damages—to be “important substantive right[s].”64 
Contractual attempts to force an adhering party to waive such rights 
in advance are routinely held to be invalid under the general state law 
principle of unconscionability.65 Alternatively, such prospective 
waivers should be deemed void as against public policy.66  
2. Unfair Arbitration Procedures 
The specific arbitration procedure spelled out in the contract may, 
if it is sufficiently unfair, provide another basis to question the 
validity of an arbitration agreement. While “generalized attacks” on 
the adequacy of arbitration procedures are not a basis to invalidate a 
pre-dispute arbitration clause, claims of procedural inadequacy of 
arbitration under the terms of a specific arbitration agreement may be 
“resolv[ed] in specific cases.”67 Procedural overreaching has been 
held in some cases to create “a sham system unworthy even of the 
name of arbitration.”68 Again, the key point is that such contractual 
unfairness is simply an instance of unconscionability doctrine, and 
therefore a matter of state law.69 
3. Imposition of Burdensome Arbitration Fees 
The question of who will bear the forum fees of arbitration 
pursuant to pre-dispute adhesion contracts has emerged as an 
important issue in the last few years. Whereas access fees to a 
judicial forum are limited to the initial filing fee and possibly jury 
fees, these pale in comparison to the filing and administrative charges 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 64. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (the right to 
punitive damages “is an important substantive right.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); 
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 66. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 195 (1979). 
 67. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. 
 68. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 69. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 179 (Cal. 1981). 
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and arbitrator fees in an arbitration, which can amount to thousands, 
or even tens of thousands, of dollars.70 Moreover, if the plaintiff lost, 
he or she could be assessed that entire amount by the arbitrator. In the 
absence of a contractual allocation, traditional arbitration practice 
supplies a “default rule” under which each party pays half the 
arbitrators’ fees unless the arbitrators, in their discretion, order the 
losing party to pay all the fees. Thus, where the arbitration agreement 
does not mention the allocation of arbitrator fees, it is assumed they 
will be assessed, at least in part, against the employee.71 
A number of courts have taken exception to the idea that a 
plaintiff could be forced, in essence, to pay thousands of dollars to 
the adjudicator to resolve important rights against the drafter of an 
adhesive employment or consumer contract. These courts have 
imposed a blanket rule against enforcing such agreements.72 The U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. 
Randolph,73 recognized that prohibitive arbitration fees might run 
afoul of the principle that arbitration agreements cannot force an 
employee to “forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute,” but 
nevertheless rejected a blanket prohibition against express or implied 
“fee-sharing” arbitration agreements. Instead, Randolph held that the 
plaintiff had failed to make an individualized showing that the fees 
were prohibitive or deterred her from pursuing her statutory claims 
under the federal Truth in Lending Act.74 
Randolph is best understood as a limited decision about 
arbitrability of Truth in Lending Act claims in particular, or possibly 
 70. For example, a four-day arbitration of a small-to-moderate employment discrimination 
case before the American Arbitration Association claiming compensatory and punitive damages 
of, for example, $200,000, would cost about $12,000. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small 
Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled 
Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 44 n.30 (assuming an arbitrator’s hourly rate of $350 per 
hour); AAA, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Jan. 2001), 
www.adr.org.  
 71. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 31.2.4, at pp. 
31.12–13 (1999). 
 72. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Shankle 
v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, 163 F.3d 1230, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet 
Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (Cox, J., concurring); Cole v. 
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 73. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 74. Id. at 91. 
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federal statutory claims more broadly. But it is not a decision that 
binds state courts on determinations of state unconscionability 
principles, under which the arbitration forum-fee issue should 
normally be decided. To construe Randolph as binding on state courts 
would be to treat it as creating a federal common law of 
unconscionability—that a finding of unconscionability will not be 
made on the basis of a cost claim without the specific proof—
arguably preempting state law on the subject. Such a construction of 
Randolph would fly in the face of the presumption against 
preemption, and should therefore be rejected. 
4. Venue Provisions 
Many arbitration agreements now appear bundled with venue 
clauses, requiring that the arbitration takes place in a distant state that 
maximizes convenience of the drafting party while discouraging the 
plaintiff from pursuing her claims.75 To the extent that the FAA 
protects a contractual forum choice, it is the choice of arbitration over 
litigation; the FAA expresses no preference about where the 
arbitration take place. The enforceability of a venue provision in an 
arbitration agreement is thus a separate question not governed by the 
FAA. Many states have statutes prohibiting out-of-state venue 
provisions in certain kinds of contracts, as well as statutory or 
common law policies disfavoring oppressive venue clauses in 
contracts.76 These state policies are analytically separate from the 
question of arbitration per se, and are therefore not preempted by the 
FAA. 
5. Mutuality and Contract Formation 
Numerous courts have applied state contract principles to deny 
enforcement of arbitration agreements on a variety of contract 
 75. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harris Research, 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001) (contract requiring 
California franchisee to arbitrate in Utah); In re Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc. and Nebel, 765 F. 
Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (contract requiring California employee to arbitrate in Ohio). 
 76. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West 2004) (prohibiting out-of-state 
forum selection clause in franchise agreements); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-133f(f), -133g(a) 
(2000) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971). 
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formation issues. Where the agreement requires the adhering party, 
but not the drafter, to arbitrate claims, courts have analyzed these 
kinds of agreements as reflecting an absence of mutuality of 
obligation, and therefore conclude either that there is no agreement at 
all, or that the term is one-sided and unconscionable.77 The FAA 
requires a “written agreement” to arbitrate as a prerequisite to an 
order compelling arbitration.78 Courts are divided on the issue of 
whether notices or other un-executed writings purporting to make 
unilateral contract modifications—such as employee handbooks or 
“bill stuffers”—can create a binding arbitration agreement.79 
However a court resolves the issue, it is plainly one of state law of 
contract formation, and not purported “federal common law” under 
the FAA.80 
B. Arbitrability: Is the Claim or Remedy Unsuited for Arbitration? 
Arbitrability would seem to be a matter of state contract law under 
the principle that “arbitration is a matter of contract between the 
 77. See, e.g., Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 
2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause in “payday loan” contract that required the 
borrower to submit her claims to arbitration, but allowed the lender to pursue a collection action 
in court, due to “lack of mutuality”); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d at 
697; Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 1998); Floss v. Ryan’s 
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying state contract principles of 
“illusory” promises to deny enforcement to arbitration agreement requiring the employee to 
arbitrate his claims before a private arbitration company that specifically reserved the right to 
modify the rules and procedures of the arbitration without notice to or consent from the 
employee); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(applying state contract principles to hold non-mutual arbitration agreement unenforceable 
because unsupported by consideration). 
 78. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  
 79. Compare Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (credit 
card “bill-stuffer” containing arbitration agreement failed to demonstrate that “the parties 
intended to contract” about ADR), and Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, 550 N.W.2d 
243 (Mich. 1996) (provision in employee handbook disclaiming the creation of contractual 
rights vitiated the “agreement” element of the handbook’s arbitration provision), with Patterson 
v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997) (handbook did establish binding 
arbitration agreement).  
 80. See First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (contract formation 
questions pertaining to arbitration agreements are “generally” resolved under state law); 
Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996) (“[S]tate law may be applied if that 
law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
generally.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
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parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those 
disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”81 
Arbitrability questions may have been needlessly complicated by 
overheated dicta in an early arbitration decision that spoke of the 
creation of “a federal [judge-made] substantive law of arbitrability,” 
under which “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”82 The Court has properly 
retreated from the implication that state law would be entirely 
displaced in construing arbitration agreements—an extreme position 
that flies in the face of the section 2 savings clause. In First Options 
of Chicago v. Kaplan, the Supreme Court held that courts “generally” 
should apply the state law of contract formation to determine what 
the parties agreed to arbitrate.83 The presumption in favor of applying 
state law to arbitrability questions is strengthened by the presumption 
against preemption. The following two arbitrability issues are 
prominent in current cases. 
1. Individual Claims and Remedies 
In two recent cases, the California Supreme Court decided that 
statutory “public policy” claims could not be compelled into 
arbitration. In Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California,84 the 
court held that claims for injunctive relief under the state Consumer 
Legal Remedies Act, designed to protect the public from deceptive 
business practices, were not subject to arbitration. In Cruz v. 
Pacificare Health Systems,85 the court extended that holding to 
preserve claims to enjoin unfair competition and misleading 
 81. First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. at 943. 
 82. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 25 & n.32 
(1983). 
 83. 514 U.S. at 944–45. To be sure, a certain contradictory quality remains. The Court 
went on to qualify that general rule by establishing two specific federal common law 
presumptions: ambiguity over whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute on the merits 
would be resolved in favor of arbitration; whereas ambiguity over whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate “arbitrability”—whether a court or the arbitrator gets to decide who decides the 
merits—should be resolved in favor of leaving that issue to the court. Id. How a court should 
resolve the dispute over whether a court or arbitrator decides, however, is presumably left to 
state law. 
 84. 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999). 
 85. 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003). 
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advertising under the state Business and Professions Code. According 
to the Broughton and Cruz courts, such claims were unsuitable for 
arbitration because (1) these statutory injunction claims were “for the 
benefit of the general public rather than the party bringing the 
action,” and (2) courts have “significant institutional advantages over 
arbitration in administering a public injunctive remedy, which as a 
consequence will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of the 
public benefit if the remedy is entrusted to arbitrators.”86 For these 
reasons, the court concluded that there was an inherent conflict 
between arbitration and the statutory remedies, which gave rise to the 
inference that the state legislature intended to withhold such public 
injunction claims from arbitration. 
Cruz and Broughton raise the question: how can a state legislature 
decide to withhold a public injunction claim from arbitration when 
Southland and Perry v. Thomas hold that the FAA “withdrew the 
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by 
arbitration”?87 The California court’s answer to that question is to 
assert that state legislatures have the same power that Congress does, 
to make certain kinds of claims non-arbitrable, either expressly or 
implicitly by creating a right or remedy having an “inherent conflict” 
with arbitration.88 
At first blush, the California court’s reasoning raises eyebrows: 
after all, the Supremacy Clause makes clear that Congress and state 
legislatures are not on equal footing when it comes to creating 
exceptions to a federal statute. But on closer inspection, Cruz and 
Broughton are absolutely right. To begin with, as the court is quite 
correct in pointing out, the U.S. Supreme Court “has never directly 
decided whether a legislature may restrict a private arbitration 
agreement when it inherently conflicts with a public statutory 
purpose that transcends private interests.”89 All of the FAA 
preemption cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court have involved 
 86. Id. at 1162–63 (quoting Broughton, 988 P.2d at 67). 
 87. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 88. See Cruz, 66 P.3d at 1162–63; Broughton, 988 P.2d at 72 (citing Shearson/American 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–26 (1987)). 
 89. Cruz, 66 P.3d at 1163 (quoting Broughton, 988 P.2d 67, 78–79 (citations omitted)). 
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private damages claims, not public injunctions. As such, the Court 
has never had occasion to determine whether broad injunctive relief 
affecting third parties or the public can be issued by arbitrators. What 
the Court has said, however, is that compelled arbitration of statutory 
claims is appropriate insofar as the claimant “does not forgo . . . 
substantive rights . . . .”90 Absent an express guarantee by the 
Supreme Court that arbitrators can issue and administer public 
injunctions, a state court is free to reach the common-sense and 
highly practical conclusion that arbitrators cannot do so. In such a 
case, compelling public injunction claims into arbitration would 
indeed “forgo substantive rights.” 
Moreover, Broughton and Cruz exemplify the best approach of a 
state court to the federalism issues surrounding FAA preemption. The 
California court’s correct conclusion that the FAA has not 
authoritatively been held to encompass public injunction claims is 
significant, because under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, states retain by default all powers not removed from 
them, either by constitutional provisions or by statutory preemption 
under the Supremacy Clause.91 By refusing to extend the FAA to a 
new area—public injunction rather than private damages claims—the 
Court, albeit without explicitly acknowledging this, properly applied 
the federalism-based presumption against preemption and the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The presumption against 
preemption should work against any extension of the FAA into a new 
area, in the absence of a clear statement from Congress of an intent to 
upset the normal federal-state balance. Here, a state’s power to 
administer its own dispute resolution system, and allocate certain 
substantive state claims to specific state remedial and procedural 
structures, would be undermined by extending FAA preemption. 
Similarly, this aspect of Southland—dictating intrastate dispute 
resolution mechanisms for state law claims—is the most 
constitutionally dubious application of FAA preemption. By 
 90. E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)), quoted in 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).  
 91. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
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upholding the authority of the state in this case, the California 
Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue—an issue that has 
never expressly been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
2. Class Actions 
The question of whether a state law preserving a plaintiff’s right 
to pursue class-wide relief is preempted by the FAA was raised, but 
not decided, by the Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle.92 The lower courts continue to struggle with the question of 
whether the drafting party can use an arbitration agreement to prevent 
class actions being brought against it. Whether viewed as a question 
of “arbitrability” or “validity,” the right answer to this question 
should be “no.”93 The right to proceed in the form of a class action, 
aside from promoting state judicial policies in favor of the 
expeditious resolution of large numbers of disputes, is also a 
substantial right for the litigant. “The policy at the very core of the 
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a 
solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”94 Adhesive, pre-dispute 
waivers of class action remedies should be void as against public 
policy, or unconscionable, just like any substantive waiver of a 
damages remedy.95 Alternatively, if class actions are not “arbitrable” 
under state law, a plaintiff should have the right to proceed in court 
on a class claim. 
 92. 539 U.S. 444, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). For a detailed analysis of that decision, see 
Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping, supra note 61. 
 93. See Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping, supra note 61. 
 94. Amchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 279–80 (W.Va. 
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002) (predispute waiver of class action unconscionable); 
Cruz, 66 P.3d 1157 (arbitration agreement not enforceable against claim involving remedy 
designed to protect the public). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p129 Schwartz book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:129 
 
 
 
C. Regulation of Arbitrators 
California has recently enacted ethics rules governing arbitrators 
and companies that provide arbitration services.96 Other states could 
follow suit. Litigation is already beginning to percolate over whether 
such state regulation of arbitrators is preempted by the FAA.97 
Clearly, the FAA should not be held to preempt the California law 
or any reasonable state regulation of arbitrators or arbitration 
providers. The FAA does not occupy the field of regulating 
arbitration. Therefore, state arbitrator regulation is not preempted 
unless it “stands as an obstacle”98 to the congressional purpose of the 
FAA, that of making arbitration agreements “as enforceable as other 
contracts, but not more so.”99 Arbitrators are in important ways, 
adjuncts to the state courts, since they often displace the state courts 
as the official dispute resolution forum.100 Arbitrators are thus given 
an important public trust, and arbitration agreements are in this sense 
like other contracts which create relationships of trust and confidence 
with professionals—such as attorneys, physicians, financial advisors, 
and real estate agents. States routinely regulate the licensure and 
professional standards of such occupations. Allowing regulation and 
even licensing of arbitrators would treat arbitration agreements like 
these other contracts, consistent with the FAA’s purpose. 
Furthermore, the states’ power to regulate arbitrators is an important 
element of state sovereignty: arbitrator regulation comes within the 
states’ sovereign interest in controlling their own judicial processes. 
Finally, since contemporary arbitrators are almost invariably lawyers, 
the states’ power to regulate arbitrators is closely related to their 
 96. See CAL. CODE CIV. P. §§ 1281.92, .96 (2003); Maureen A. Weston, Re-Examining 
Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449 
(2004). 
 97. See, e.g., Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 
2003). 
 98. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). 
 99. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967); 
accord H.R. Res. 96, 68th Cong. (1924) (FAA places arbitration agreements on “same footing 
as other contracts”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (same). 
 100. Arbitration is often adjunct to federal litigation as well, but the vast majority of 
litigation takes place in state courts. See Parmet, supra note 39, at 58 n.351. 
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historically sovereign power to regulate the practicing bar.101 For 
these reasons, and in light of the presumption against preemption, 
most state regulation of arbitrators should not be deemed 
preempted.102 
CONCLUSION 
It is an open secret that the “national policy favoring arbitration” 
was not the creation of Congress in enacting the FAA in 1925, but is 
rather an “edifice of [the Court’s] own creation”103 starting in the 
1980s. There are various policies that might motivate the judicial 
creation of a pro-arbitration doctrine. The primary motivation is the 
removal of cases from crowded court dockets and a belief that 
allowing companies to use private contracts to control disputes with 
their customers and employees is economically beneficial to society. 
Whatever might be said for these policies, it is noteworthy that they 
are never mentioned as justifications in judicial decisions.104 We 
know that docket control and deregulation are there as motivations, 
just as much as we know that the consistent unwillingness of any 
court to admit those justifications stems from a sense of judicial 
propriety: they are not proper policies for courts to impose. 
Even if federal courts overindulge an impulse to pursue such pro-
arbitration policies at the expense of the proper, judicially cognizable 
value of promoting federalism, the Supremacy Clause does not 
require state courts to follow suit. Once the conflict between state and 
federal laws leaves the legislative sphere and enters the courts, the 
most natural spokespersons for the autonomy and integrity of state 
contract law are state judges. If they do not serve as federalism 
guardians against the excessive inroads into state contract law, who 
will?  
 101. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977) (“[T]he regulation of the 
activities of the bar is at the core of the State’s power to protect the public.”). 
 102. Such regulation should be preempted only if it has the purpose or effect of restricting 
the supply of arbitrators to the point where it is impracticable or impossible for parties to have 
their claims arbitrated. 
 103. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 104. Well, almost never. Cf. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he hope has long been that the [FAA] could serve as a therapy for the ailment of the 
crowded docket.”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p129 Schwartz book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:129 
 
 
Appendix A 
Decisions Finding FAA Preemption of State Law,  
(January 2002–April 2004) 
(partial list) 
1. Stawski Distrib. Co. v. Browary Zywiec S.A., 349 
F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 2003) (FAA preempts Illinois Beer Industry Fair 
Dealing Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 720/1–/9 (2004)). 
2. Pedcor Mgmt., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations 
Pers. of Tex., 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003) (FAA preempts Texas 
judicial policy allowing courts to certify class-wide arbitration). 
3. Stone v. Doerge, 328 F.3d 343 (7th Cir. 2003) (FAA 
preempts state case law regarding construction of arbitration 
agreements). 
4. Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Paramount Saturn, Ltd., 326 
F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2003) (FAA preempts statutory provision for 
exclusive jurisdiction of Texas Motor Vehicle Board). 
5. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (FAA 
preempts antiwaiver provision of California Consumer Legal 
Remedies Act). 
6. Brayman Constr. Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 
622 (3d Cir. 2003) (FAA preempts state law rule suggesting that 
statutory tort claims for bad faith insurance practices are not 
arbitrable). 
7. Arkcom Digital Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 289 F.3d 536 
(8th Cir. 2002) (FAA preempts Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-72-201 to -210 (2004)). 
8. Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 
F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2002) (state judicial rule construing arbitration 
agreements). 
9. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe, 
313 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (FAA preempts state case 
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law placing “heightened requirements” on enforcement of arbitration 
clauses). 
10. HD Brous & Co., Inc., v. Mrzyglocki, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3095 (S.D.N.Y. February 25, 2004) (FAA preempts N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 7502 providing that court decides statute of limitations 
questions in otherwise arbitrable cases). 
11. Martin v. SCI Mgmt., 296 F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (FAA preempts New York case law precluding arbitral awards 
of punitive damages). 
12. Pine Ridge Coal Co. v. Loftis, 271 F. Supp. 2d 905 
(S.D.W. Va. 2003) (FAA preempts antiwaiver provision in West 
Virginia workers’ compensation law, W. VA. CODE § 23-2-7 (2003)). 
13. Skinner v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24045 (N.D. Cal. December 29, 2003) (FAA 
preempts CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 1281.92, setting state standards for 
review of arbitration awards). 
14. M.A. Mortenson/The Meyne Co. v. Edward E. Gillen 
Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23175 (D. Minn. December 17, 2003) 
(FAA preempts Illinois Building and Construction Contract Act, 815 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 665/10 (2002), which made contract provisions 
requiring arbitration in another state unenforceable as against public 
policy). 
15. Newby v. Enron Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25038 
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2003) (FAA preempts New York state securities 
law, the Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (2004)). 
16. Greene v. Chase Manhattan Auto. Fin. Corp., 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21650 (E.D. La. December 2, 2003) (FAA 
preempts Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, LA. REV. STAT. 
51:1401 (2004)). 
17. Housh v. Dinovo Invs., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3707 (D. Kan. March 7, 2003) (FAA preempts Kansas arbitration 
statute precluding tort claims from arbitration, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-
401(c)). 
18. Lomax v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y, 228 
F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365–66 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (FAA preempts Georgia 
Arbitration Act because the contract was a transaction in interstate 
commerce and the parties did not specify that Georgia law would 
apply). 
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19. Hawayek v. A.T. Cross Co., 221 F. Supp. 2d 254 
(D.P.R. 2002) (FAA preempts Puerto Rico Sales Representative 
Protection Act (Law 21), 10 P.R. LAWS ANN. §§ 279(a)–(h)). 
20. Vigil v. Sears Nat’l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D. 
La. 2002) (FAA preempts state decisional law requiring reasonable 
notice for arbitration clause). 
21. Ruedemann v. Energy Operators, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 
894 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (FAA preempts TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE. §§ 171.001–173.004, barring arbitration of personal injury 
claims where party’s attorney did not sign arbitration agreement). 
22. Lewis Tree Serv. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 
2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (FAA preempts New Jersey Consumer Fraud 
Act provisions for class actions and state law claims of breach of 
implied and express warranties, good faith and fair dealing, breach of 
contract, and fraud). 
23. Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. L&H Tuxes, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12792 at *21 n.7 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2002) (dicta) (FAA likely 
nullified the California Franchise Act provision voiding out-of-state 
forum provisions).  
24. Bill Gray Nissan, Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor 
Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17297 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 2002) (FAA 
preempts Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, 63 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 818.1 through 818.37 (2004)). 
25. Sparks v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11808 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2002) (FAA preempts Texas 
General Arbitration Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 171.002(a)(2) precluding arbitration of claims for acquisition of 
property less than $50,000). 
26. Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 2004 Ala. 
LEXIS 28 (Ala. February 13, 2004) (FAA preempts ALA. CODE § 8-
1-41(3) (2004) prohibiting enforcement of predispute arbitration 
agreements). 
27. Hedges v. Carrigan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004) (FAA preempts CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 1298 (2004), 
setting forth notice requirements for arbitration agreements in real 
estate contracts). 
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28. Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Massie, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65 
(Cal. App. 2004) (FAA preempts CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7 (2004), 
state administrative wage and hour proceedings). 
29. Garcia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Cal. 
App. 2004) (FAA preempts California judicial policy that classwide 
claims are not arbitrable). 
30. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
393 (Cal. App. 2003), depublished by grant of review, 65 P.3d 1285 
(Cal. 2003) (FAA preempts statutory right to consumer class action 
proceeding, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1752 (2004)). 
31. Basura v. U.S. Home Corp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328 
(Cal. App. 2002) (FAA preempts CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1298.7 
(2004), barring compelled arbitration of personal injury actions under 
arbitration agreements in construction contracts). 
32. Pitkin v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 2002 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 2610 (March 27, 2002) (FAA preempts state law 
standard for waiver of right to arbitrate). 
33. Film Finances, Inc., v. Superior Court, 2002 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3886 (Cal. Ct. App. February 15, 2002) (FAA 
preempts CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1281.2(c) that precluded a party 
to pending litigation from moving to compel arbitration of case 
arising from same transaction). 
34. Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003) (FAA 
preempts standards for enforceability of arbitration agreements for 
health care under Colorado Health Care Availability Act COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 13-64-401 (2004)). 
35. District of Columbia v. Greene, 806 A.2d 216 (D.C. 
2002) (FAA preempts District of Columbia Procurement Practices 
Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-301.01 (2004), requiring procurement 
disputes with city government to go before administrative review 
board). 
36. Assuranceföreningen Skuld v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, 
Inc., 847 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (FAA preempts 
judicial policy precluding arbitration of insurance disputes). 
37. Jensen v. Rice, 809 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (FAA preempts Florida case law disfavoring out-of-state forum 
selection clauses). 
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38. Prudential Secs., Inc. v. Katz, 807 So. 2d 173, 175 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (FAA preemption defeats argument that 
Florida Whistleblower Act claims not arbitrable). 
39. Heaberlin Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 
816 (Iowa 2002) (FAA preempts IOWA CODE § 679A.1 (2003), 
precluding enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements).  
40. Wolff v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs., 15 Mass. L. Rep. 
224, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 350 at *8–*9 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(FAA preempts state court interpretations that state securities claims 
not arbitrable). 
41. Abela v. General Motors Corp., 669 N.W.2d 271 
(2003) (FAA preempts provisions for judicial forum in Michigan’s 
Warranties on New Motor Vehicles Act (Lemon Law), MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 257.1401–.1410 (2004) and Michigan’s Consumer 
Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.901–.922 (2004)). 
42. Le Gere v. New Millenium Homes, Inc., 2003 Mich. 
App. LEXIS 3416 (Mich. Ct. App. December 23, 2003) (FAA 
preempts MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3.602(B)(2) (2004), Michigan statute 
providing that court may determine existence of arbitration 
agreement summarily, without jury trial). 
43. Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 2002 
Mo. App. LEXIS 2270 (Mo. Ct. App. November 19, 2002), vacated 
on other grounds, 112 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. 2003) (FAA preempts MO. 
REV. STAT. § 429.330, providing exclusive judicial procedure for 
equitable mechanic’s lien). 
44. Cornhusker Int’l Trucks, Inc. v. Thomas Built Buses, 
Inc., 637 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 2002) (FAA preempts NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 60-1420 (2000), providing exclusive remedy for motor vehicle 
dealership franchise disputes). 
45. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 306 A.D.2d 877 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (FAA preempts New York state arbitration 
law). 
46. Boynton v. ESC Med. Sys., 566 S.E.2d 730 (N.C. 
App. 2002) (FAA preempts N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (2004), 
invalidating out-of-state forum selection clauses). 
47. Rich v. Walsh, 590 S.E.2d 506 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
(FAA preempts South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act). 
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48. Blanton v. Stathos, 570 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2002) (FAA preempts S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (2004), 
imposing certain form requirements on arbitration agreements). 
49. Smith v. Gateway, Inc., 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5438 
(July 26, 2002) (FAA preempts non-waiver provisions of the 
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (2002)). 
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APPENDIX B  
STATE LAWS CONTAINING GENERIC ANTIWAIVER PROVISIONS 
(partial list) 
 
1. ALA. CODE § 8-6-19(h) (2002) (civil remedies for violations of 
Alabama Blue Sky laws). 
2. ALASKA STAT. § 34.55.030(g) (2002) (statutory rights in 
connection with the purchase of subdivided land). 
3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1560 (2003) (statutory rights under 
Petroleum Products laws). 
4. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-42-109 (2000) (rights under Arkansas 
Blue Sky laws). 
5. CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20010 (2004) (rights under the 
California franchise investment laws). 
6. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-604(11) (2003) (rights provided 
under the Colorado Blue Sky laws). 
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-90a(f) (2004) (rights under the 
Connecticut Condominium Act, including remedies for 
misrepresentations in public offering statements). 
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 7323(g) (1999) (rights under Delaware 
Blue Sky Laws). 
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.615(9) (2002) (rights under Florida 
Telephone Solicitation Act in connection with telemarketing 
transactions). 
10. HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(F) (2002) (rights under Hawaii 
franchise laws). 
11. IDAHO CODE § 30-1446(4) (1999) (rights under Idaho Blue 
Sky Laws). 
12. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/41 (rights under the Illinois 
Franchise Disclosure Act), http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/ 
ilcs/ilcs.asp (last visited August 2, 2004). 
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-1-107(1) (West 2004) (rights under 
consumer protection laws in consumer credit transactions). 
14. IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.1107 (2003) (rights under the Iowa 
Consumer Credit Code). 
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15. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3316(g) (2003) (rights, including civil 
remedies, under Kansas laws relating to purchase of subdivided 
lands). 
16. KY. REV. STAT. § 367.460 (1994) (rights of buyers in home 
solicitation transactions). 
17. ME. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, tit. 9-A § 1-107(1) (2004).  
18. MD. CORPS. & ASS’N. CODE § 11-703(h) (2004) (rights under 
Maryland Blue Sky Laws). 
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 410(g) (2002) (rights 
under Massachusetts Blue Sky Laws). 
20. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.2332 (West 1997) (rights 
under Michigan Resort District Rehabilitation Act). 
21. MINN. STAT. § 82A.23 (1999) (rights accorded under 
Minnesota law relating to the purchase of membership camping 
contracts). 
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1721.01(3) (1997) (rights for a purchaser 
under the Nebraska Commodity Code). 
23. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 687(4) (2004) (rights under the New 
York Franchise Act). 
24. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.49 (West 2003) (rights of 
consumers under Ohio Uniform Commercial Code with respect to 
“prepaid entertainment contracts” such as dance studio contracts or 
health spa services).  
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A § 1-107(1) (1996) (rights under the 
Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code). 
26. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2189(a) (West 1993) (rights 
under the Pennsylvania Credit Services Act) 
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-107(1) (West 2002) (rights under the 
South Carolina Consumer Protection Code). 
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-122(I) (2002) (rights under the 
Tennessee Blue Sky Laws). 
29. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 17.42 (2004) (rights under 
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act). 
30. WIS. STAT. § 421.106(1) (1998) (rights under the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act). 
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